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We develop a tractable  general theory for the study of the economic and demographic impact of epidemics. In particular, we  analytically 
characterise the short and medium term consequences of epidemics for population size, age pyramid, economic performance and income 
distribution. To this end, we develop a three period overlapping generations where altruistic parents choose optimal health expenditures for 
their children and themselves. The survival probability of (junior) adults and children depend on such investments. Agents can be skilled or 
unskilled. The model  emphasizes the role of orphans. Ophans are not only penalized in front of death , they  are also penalized in the access 
to education. Epidemics are modeled as one period exogenous shocks to the survival rates.  We identify three kinds of epidemics depending 
on how the epidemic shock alters the marginal efficiency of health expenditures. We first study the demographic dynamics, and prove that 
while a one period epidemic shock has no permanent effect on income distribution, it can perfectly alter it in the short and medium run. We 
then study the impact of the three kinds of epidemics when they hit children and/or junior adults. We prove that while the three epidemics 
have  significantly  different  demographic  implications  in  the medium run, they all imply a worsening in the short and medium run of 
economic performance and income distribution. In particular, the distributional implications of the model mainly rely on orphans: if orphans 
are more penalized in the access to a high llevel of education than in front of death, they will necessarily lead to the medium term increase in 






Epidemics, orphans, income distribution, endogenous survival, medium term dynamics 
 
 
JEL Classification numbers 
 
O1, D9, I1, I2 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited from several suggestions and comments by Bruno Decreuse, David de la Croix, 
Mathias Doepke, Cecilia García Penalosa, Alan Kirman, John Knowles, Omar Licandro, Omer Moav, Rodrigo 
Suarez, Uwe Sunde, Alain Trannoy, and participants in meetings and seminars held at IZA Bonn, GREQAM 
Marseille, the Technical University of Vienna, and Université catholique de Louvain. Boucekkine acknowledges 
the financial support of  the Belgian research programmes PAI P5/10 and ARC 03/08 302. The usual disclaimer 
applies.    
2  Department  of  economics  and  CORE,  Université  catholique  de  Louvain,  and  University  of  Glasgow. 
Corresponding author : Place Montesquieu, 3, 1348 Louvain la Neuve (Belgium). boucekkine@core.ucl.ac.be 
3 University Paris I, CES and CEPREMAP, Paris. laffargue@pse.ens.fr   1 
1.  Introduction 
The  study  of  the  economic  effects  of  epidemics  has  always  been  of  interest  to  many 
economists  (see  for  example  Hirshleifer,  1987).  The  topic  has  regained  interest  and  has 
become an important research area more recently due to two main factors. On one hand, the 
more recent HIV/AIDS pandemic and its apparent massive demographic effects, especially in 
sub Saharan  Africa,  has  suggested  an  exceptionally  abundant  literature,  overwhelmingly 
empirical (see among many others, Bloom and Mahal, 1997, Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez, 
2005, Kalemli Ozcan, 2006 or McDonald and Roberts, 2006). On the other hand, the rise of a 
so called  ``unified  growth  theory’’  (comprehensively  surveyed  by  Galor,  2005),  specially 
concerned with the understanding of the Malthusian stagnation and the determinants of the 
transition to the modern growth regime, has led to reconsider the role of epidemics in the 
development process (see Lagerlof, 2003). 
 
Indeed,  several authors have already pointed out the potential role of the main epidemics, 
notably  the  Black  Death  in  the  fourteenth  century,  in  (partially)  shaping  economic 
development in the West. Among them, Herlihy (1997) has developed a complete articulated 
view of the socio economic impact of the Black Death. According to him, while the epidemic 
caused a terrific mortality crisis
4, it ``broke the stalemate of the feudal society’’ and it is one 
of the main factors of the ``transformation of the West’’. The mechanisms put forward by 
Herlihy are clear: A huge mortality crisis like the Black Death has an immediate and huge 
effect on labor supply, which induces a sizeable increase in wages, therefore creating the need 
to produce labor saving devices, ultimately leading to decisive innovations.
5 Coupled with 
large drops in land rents
6 favoring the switch to less land intensive technologies, this massive 
wage effect is at the basis of the development process in Europe, according to Herlihy.  
This view of the Black Death as an engine of a positive long run transformation is actually 
very close to Young’s striking assessment of AIDS socio economic consequences on South 
Africa, as acknowledged by the author himself (Young, 2005). While the short term effects 
are terrific, the long run can be much less disastrous, and even favourable, if the induced 
wage  effects  ends  up  decreasing  fertility  (via  increased  female  participation  in  the  labor 
                                                 
4 The Black Death killed between one third and one half of the European population. 
5 Herlihy interprets the invention of Gutenberg machine within this general argument.  
6 This is at least true in France and England. Moreover, the link between the Black Death and the drop in lands’ 
rents is much neater in the England case than for France. In the latter, lands’ rents started to drop prior to the 
Black Death, as a result of the one hundred years war. See Robbins (1928).   2 
market). Yet the stories conveyed by this view are far from unanimously accepted. On the 
Black  Death  disaster,  many  historians  do  not  share  the  opinion  that  the  epidemic  has 
generated such a powerful Hicksian mechanism driving the economy from (extremely) high 
wages  to  an  era  of  sustained  labor saving  technological  progress.  For  Robbins  (1928)  , 
``…The English villein, lured by the prospects of high wages in neighboring towns, must 
sooner or later have deserted his manor. The plague …furnished him an excuse’’. On the 
AIDS crisis, no convincing empirical study has so far identified a sizeable wage effect in Sub 
Saharan  Africa  although  a  more  recent  paper  by  Young  (2007)  concludes  that  HIV  is 
lowering fertility in all the countries of the area. Kalemli Ozcan (2006) defends the opposite 
view. After pointing out the South African exception, she suggests that the impact of AIDS 
on fertility might even go the other way as a result of a mere insurance effect. 
 
This paper presents an alternative theory of epidemics. In this theory, wages are not affected 
by mortality crisis due to a linear production function, and fertility is given. In this way, we 
neutralize the mechanisms outlined above. Instead our theory highlights the role of orphans in 
the transmission of the mortality shocks.  In the main mortality crises studied (Black Death, 
Spanish flu or AIDS), death affects more the adult population of working age than younger or 
older populations. Nonetheless, when young adults die, not only do they reduce the amount of 
labour and human capital used in production, but they also leave orphans behind them. To 
show  how  this  effect  can  be  disastrous,  we  can quote  the  following  extract  of an article 
published by The Economist (2003) ``… one-in-ten sub-Saharan children is now an orphan. 
A third of these are the result of AIDS. Orphaning rates above 5% worry UNICEF because 
they exceed the capacity of local communities to care for parentless children. So do places 
such as Zambia, where almost 12% of children are AIDS orphans…. Orphans tend to be 
poorer than non orphans, and to face a higher risk of malnutrition, stunting and death — 
even if they are free of HIV themselves. Orphans are less likely to attend school because they 
cannot afford the fees but also because step-parents tend to educate their own children first”.  
 
Case, Paxson and Ableidinger (2004) give interesting complements to this view. Orphans live 
in foster families who discriminate against them and in favour of the children of the family 
head. The probability of the school enrolment of an orphan is inversely proportional to the 
degree of relatedness of the child to the household head. Gertler, Levine and Martinez (2003) 
show that parental loss does not operate only through a reduction in household resources.   3 
Parental presence, including the loss of mentoring, the transmission of values and emotional 
and psychological support, plays an important role in investment in child human capital.  
 
These findings are of course consistent with the broader view that the amount of human 
capital (education and health) embodied in a person strongly results from decisions taken by 
his parents. Bowles and Gentis (2002) quote a series of empirical results for the United States. 
A son born in the highest income decile has a probability of 22.9% to reach the same decile 
and a probability of 2.4% to reach the lowest income decile. A son born in the lowest income 
decile has a probability of 1.3% to reach the highest decile and a probability of 31.2% to 
reach the lowest decile. Grawe and Mulligan (2002) review cross country evidence showing 
that  countries  with  lower  public  provision  of  human  capital  experience  smaller 
intergenerational  mobility.  For  instance,  less  developed  countries  exhibit  strong 
intergenerational  transmission.  The  connection  between  the  absence  of  intergenerational 
mobility and education is well documented. Bowles and Gentis show that this situation can 
also be linked to the health of children, which is itself a function of their parents’ income (see 
also Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2001).  
 
Our theory of epidemics is completely in this line. In our model, people live for three periods, 
successively as children, junior adults and senior adults. A junior adult has an exogenous 
number of children and is perfectly altruistic in that he only cares for the survival of his 
children and the social position they will get. He invests in his own health and education, and 
in the health and education of his children
7. The probabilities of survival of a child and of a 
junior adult depend on the amounts of money spent by the junior adult for his own human 
capital  and  for  the  one  of  his  children.  So,  under  imperfect  credit  markets,  health  and 
education  spending  and  the  probabilities  of  survival  will  be  low  if  parents  are  poor.  
Moreover, if a parent dies and if his children become orphans, their probabilities of survival 
will be lowered. Finally, an orphan has a lower probability to reach a high level of human 
capital than a child brought up by living parents. Accordingly, a key feature of the paper is to 
consider a crucial dimension of inequality, namely inequality in front of death. Inequality 
between children has several causes. First, the children of less educated parents who have 
                                                 
7  Ricci  and  Zachariadis  (2006)  find  that  investment  in  education  and  in  health  are  positively  related  at 
equilibrium and have a reinforced impact on longevity. Cutler, Deaton and Lleras Muney (2005) show that the 
application of scientific advance and technical progress, which is facilitated by education, explains a great deal 
of the inequality in health inside a country.    4 
survived and who bring them up have a higher probability of dying before growing adults 
because  their  parents  spend  less  on  their  health  and  education.  Secondly,  less  educated 
parents spend less on their own education and health and have a higher probability to die and 
to be unable to bring their children up.  
 
 For the generality of the theory, we consider both child and adult mortality: since human 
capital is embodied in individuals and since parents decide about the education and health 
expenditures of their children, the economic and demographic impacts of epidemics is likely to 
tightly depend of the age profile of the induced mortality. To increase the scope of our theory, 
we shall also allow for any profile of the marginal efficiency of health expenditures under 
epidemics. Define at the minute the marginal efficiency of health expenditures as the impact on 
the survival probability of an individual of a marginal increase in the latter expenditures. We 
will allow for different epidemiological situations in which this marginal efficiency is either 
increased, decreased or unchanged.   
 
A key contribution of the paper is the analytical study of the impact of epidemics on the 
income  distribution  in  the  short,  medium  and  long run.  To  our  knowledge,  the  only 
theoretical  paper  which  investigates  the  links  between  health  spending,  mortality  and  the 
persistence of inequality across generations is by Chakraborty and Das (2005)
8. These authors 
base their analysis of the persistence of poverty on the fact that poor parents invest less in 
their own health and so have a high probability of dying. Thus, they save little and leave to 
their children a small bequest if they survive and a still smaller bequest if they die. The paper 
assumes  that  parents  only  care  for  their  children  if  they  are  themselves  alive  when  their 
children grow. However, parents cannot buy annuities against the saving they will leave in the 
case of their premature death (so, in this situation, children get an unplanned bequest). An 
extension of the paper introduces the possibility of investing, not only in the health of parents, 
but  in  the  education  of  children  too.  The  productivity  of  labour  depends  on  both  these 
investments.  
Nonetheless, these authors do not consider investments in the health of children nor their 
survival probability. Our paper does not only incorporate the latter critical aspect, it also takes 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
8 It should be also noted that the papers focusing on AIDS usually comment on the changes in the distributions 
of human capital and income possibly following the epidemic although they do not fully investigate them. In this   5 
a broader perspective by considering any age profile of mortality and any marginal efficiency 
of medication under epidemics. The demographic and economic properties of the model are 
fully  analytically  investigated  in  the  short,  medium  and  long run,  which  is  already  a 
contribution to the literature.  
The paper is organised as follows. The second section presents the model and its short run 
equilibrium.  The  third  section  is  devoted  to  the  transitory  dynamics  and  the  long  run 
equilibrium  of  demographic  variables.  The  fourth  section  investigates  the  economic  and 
demographic effects of epidemics. The fifth section concludes. 
2. The model: behaviour of the agents and temporary equilibrium 
We  consider  a  discrete  time,  perfect  foresight  dynamic  model  of  a  small  open  economy. 
People live for three periods, successively as children, junior adults and senior adults. We will 
start by examining the choices of a junior adult in an given period denoted  t. In a second 
paragraph we will describe the demographic variables of the model in this period. To ease the 
exposition and to be able to bring out a fully analytical characterization,  we shall refer to a 
single  good,  health  care.  The  latter  should  be  taken  in  the  much  broader  sense  of  any 
investment raising human capital (including education).  
 
2.1. The choices of a junior adult 
A junior adult enters period t with an endowment in human capital h. Healthcare is the only 
good existing in the economy. It is produced by firms, which use human capital as their 
unique input and which operate under constant returns. We will assume that the productivity 
of human capital is equal to 1 and that firms make no profit. Thus, h can also be interpreted 
as the earnings of the agent. The healthcare good can be stored without cost. The agent sets 
his saving (his storage of healthcare good)  s and his investment in health  l for the period, 
under the budget constraint  
 
(1)  l s h + =  
 
Spending on health has an effect on the lifetime of the agent. His probability of being alive in 
period  1 + t   (as  a  senior  adult)  is  ) (l p .  At  the  end  of  period  t  the  agent  will  have  an 
                                                                                                                                                          
vein,  one  could  cite  the  contributions  of  Bell,  Devarajan  and  Gersbach  (2003)  and  Corrigan,  Glomm  and 
Mendez (2004) who develop two highly interesting computable general equilibrium models.   6 
exogenous  number  n  of  children.  Senior  adults  receive  no  wages.  This  assumption  will 
simplify the model in directions that we are not very interested to investigate. The agent will 
invest  1 + e  in the health of each of his children. The probability for each of them to be alive at 
the beginning of period  2 + t  will depend on this investment. If the agent is alive in period 
1 + t  and can take care of his children, this probability will be  ) ( 1 + e l . If he is dead and if his 
children  are  orphans,  this  probability  will  be  ) ( 1 + e cl ,  with  1 0 < £ < c c .    The  budget 
constraint of the agent in period  1 + t  is: 
(2) 
1 + = ne s  
We notice that the amount invested by the agent in the health of his children will be the same 
if the agent dies or stays alive at the end of period t. This investment is equal to the saving 
made in period t. The intertemporal budget constraint of the agent is 
(3) 
1 + + = ne l h  
To simplify the model we will assume that human capital can take only two values:  - h  and 
+ h , with:  + - < < h h 0 . We will assume that a child who has living parents and who stays alive 
has a probability  p  of obtaining a human capital of 
+ h  and a probability  p - 1  of obtaining a 
human capital of 
- h . An orphan who stays alive has the probability  q of obtaining the high 
level of human capital and  q - 1  of obtaining the low level of human capital. We assume that 
1 0 £ < £ p q . 
Our junior adult has the following utility function in period t  
(4)  [ ] [ ] [ ] { }
- - + - - +
+ + - - + + - º h h h q c l h h h p l e n U ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 n p n p l  
The junior adult is wholly altruistic. His utility only depends on the expected human capital 
accumulated by his children who will reach the adult age. Our specification is in the spirit of 
evolutionary biology (see Galor and Moav, 2002 and 2005, for an earlier attempt to account 
for evolutionary biology ingredients in the theory of economic growth). Consistently with the 
traditional  Darwinian  theory,  the  parent  should  maximize  the  probability  of  survival  and 
quality of her children. Nonetheless, in contrast to Galor and Moav (2005), we keep the 
number of offspring exogenously fixed. As argued in the introduction, our paper intends to 
isolate the distributional effects of epidemics and to this end, we shut down the wage and 
fertility  channels  abundantly  commented  in  the  literature.  On  the  other  hand,  adding 
endogenous fertility to the model would require additional adjustments which will reduce 
sharply its tractability.    7 
If the junior adult reaches the age of senior adult, he will bring his children up, which will 
increase their probability of survival and their expected levels of human capital. 
+ h n  (
- h n ) 
represents the satisfaction a child brings to his parent when he reaches the adult age with the 
level of human capital 
+ h  (
- h ). We assume that  0 > n . When the child dies this satisfaction 
is 0. We will introduce the following notations 
(5)  [ ]
- - + + - = h h h p r ) ( 1 n ,  [ ]
- - + + - = h h h q c r ) ( 2 n  and  1 / 2 1 - = r r r . 
The utility function of our junior adult in period t becomes, after having removed a constant 
multiplicative term,  [ ] 1 ) ( ) ( 1 + º + r l e U p l .  r  represents the premium in satisfaction brought 
by children, when their parent stays alive, or if one prefers, the utility for parents of staying 
alive. In this case, the probability of survival of each child is higher (by a factor  c / 1 ) and his 
expected level of human capital is higher too. r , is an increasing function of the inequality in 
earnings, 
- - + - h h h / ) ( , which is expected for the next period. In the following exercises of 
comparative static, we will assume that  h and  r  can change independently. Finally, our 
junior adult must solve in period t the program 




r l e Max
e l
p l  
1 + + = ne l h  
0 , 1 ³ + e l  
Before solving this program we must give precise specifications of the survival functions:  
(7)   ) 1 /( ) ' ( ) (
1
1 1 a l
a - + =
-
+ + A Ae e , if  ( )
) 1 /( 1
1 1 ' 0
a a
-
+ - £ + £ A Ae  
1 ) ( 1 = + e l , if  ( )




+ - ³ + A Ae  
 (8)  ) 1 /( ) ' ( ) (
1 b p
b - + =
- B Bl l , if  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 ' 0
b b
- - £ + £ B Bl  
1 ) ( = l p , if  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 '
b b
- - ³ + B Bl  
with:  1 , 0 < < a b ,  0 ' , , > B B A ,  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 ' 0
a a
- - < £ A ,   ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 '
b b
- - < B .  
In the rest of the paper we will assume that we are always inside the intervals where both 
functions are strictly increasing. Deaton (2003) notices that health spending, the health state 
and the longevity of an individual are increasing and concave functions of his income: for 
instance the probability for somebody of dying between the ages of 50 and 60 is a decreasing 
convex function of his income. This concavity is a possible explanation of the impact of 
inequality on the average health state in a country, and it implies that some redistribution of 
income can increase average health.    8 
Later on, we will define an epidemic as an (anticipated or unanticipated) decrease in one of 
the parameters of the survival function, lasting for one period. There are different kinds of 
epidemics hitting the generation of the junior adults. Indeed, an epidemic can result in the 
decrease of parameter  B  or  ' B or both. We define the efficiency of adults’ health spending as 
the  derivative  of  their  probability  of  survival  with  respect  to  health  spending 
( ) ( )
b p
- + = ¶ ¶ ' / B Bl B l l .  
 
We have:  
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) 0 ' ' 1 ) /(
1 2 > + + - = ¶ ¶ ¶
- - b b p B Bl B Bl B l l ,  ( ) ( ) 0 ' ) ' /(
1 2 < + - = ¶ ¶ ¶
- - b b p B Bl B B l l , 
and  ( ) ( ) 0 ' /
1 2 2 2 < + - = ¶ ¶
- - b b p B Bl B l l . 
The efficiency of health spending decreases with an epidemic lowering  B  and increases with 
an  epidemic  decreasing  ' B .  This  efficiency  decreases  for  a  composite  epidemic,  which 
decreases the values of parameters  B  and  ' B  by the same proportion. Finally, the efficiency 
of health spending decreases with the amount of money spent on health, which is a reasonable 
result. Hereafter, we shall call an epidemic of a first kind a shock lowering  B  and  ' B  by the 
same proportion. A shock decreasing  ' B  (Resp.  B ) will be called an epidemic of the second 
(Resp.  third)  kind.  The  same  considerations  could  be  made  on  shocks  affecting  infant 
mortality, we shall therefore adopt the same terminology for epidemics lowering parameters 
A and A’. 
With the survival functions given above, program (6) becomes 
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+ - £ + A Ae ,  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 '
b b
- - £ + B Bl  
 
We make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. The parameters of the model must satisfy the constraints 
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(13)  ( ) [ ]( )
b
a ' / 1 / ' B Bh r A nBA + - <
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Now, we can establish the following lemmas.  
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(15)  n l h e / ) ( 1 - = +   
Proof. Equation (15) is the constraint in program (9). We use this constraint to eliminate  1 + e  
from the objective function.  This function is concave in  l. Equation (14) is the first order 
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B Bl . Thus, equation 
(12) defines a unique value for l, which is positive and smaller than h.  
We  have  to  check  that  this  solution  satisfies  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 '
b b
- - £ + B Bl .  This  is  equivalent  to 
( ) [ ] ) 1 /( ) 1 ( 1 ' / 1
) 1 /( 1 b a b
b - - + £ - -
- B B y  , which results from inequality (10).  
We  also  have  to  check  that  ( )
) 1 /( 1
1 1 ' / ) ( '
a a
-
+ - £ + - = + A n l h A A Ae   or 
( ) [ ] A n A h l / 1 '
) 1 /( 1 a a
- - - + ³ . This condition is satisfied because of inequality (11). □ 
 
The two following lemmas describe in detail the characteristics of the optimal decisions taken 
by a junior adult, first concerning investment in his own health, then concerning investment in 
the health of his offspring.  
Lemma 2. a) A well-endowed junior adult invests more in his health than a poorly endowed 
junior adult. b) The investment of a junior adult in his own health increases with his earnings 
and when there is an increase in the utility for parents of being alive. c) The investment of a 
junior adult in his own health decreases when the scale parameter  B decreases (epidemic of   10 
the third kind) and increases when parameter  ' B  decreases (epidemic of the second kind). 
This investment decreases if  B and  ' B decrease by the same percentage (epidemic of the first 
kind).  d)  The  investment  of  a  junior  adult  in  his  own  health  increases  when  the  scale 
parameter of the survival function of his children  A decreases (epidemic of the third kind), 
and decreases when parameter  ' A  decreases (epidemic of the second kind). This investment 
does not change when parameters  A and  ' A  decrease by the same percentage (epidemic of 
the first kind). f) Unless A’=0, the investment of a junior adult in his own health depends on 
the number of his children: It increases when the later number goes up. 
 
Lemma 3. a) A well-endowed junior adult invests more in the health of his children than a 
poorly endowed junior adult. b) The investment of a junior adult in the health of his children 
increases with his earnings and decreases when there is an increase in the utility for parents 
of being alive. c) The investment of a junior adult in the health of his children increases when 
the  scale  parameter  B decreases  and  decreases  when  parameter  ' B   decreases.  This 
investment  increases  if  parameters  B and  ' B decrease  by  the  same  percentage.  d)  The 
investment of a junior adult in  the health of his children decreases when the scale parameter 
of  the  survival  function  of  his  children  A  decreases,  and  increases  when  parameter  ' A  
decreases. This investment stays unchanged if parameters  A and  ' A  decrease by the same 
percentage. f) Unless A’=0, the total investment of a junior adult in the health of his children 
decreases with the number of children.  
 
The  model  has  several  worth mentioning  properties.  First,  and  as  announced  in  the 
introduction section, our model entails inequality in front of death. Children of parents with a 
low human capital have a higher probability of dying before growing. Moreover, such parents 
tend to spend less in their own health care (and education), and hence face a lower survival 
probability with the subsequent negative effect on the human capital of the resulting orphans.  
Second,  the  investment  decisions  taken  by  the  junior  adults  are  sensitive  to  exogenous 
changes in their survival function (Property c of Lemma 2 and 3) and to shifts in the survival 
function of their children (Property d of Lemma 2 and 3). Put in other words, an epidemic 
hitting young adults as an epidemic hitting their own children will have an impact on the 
investment decisions of these individuals.  
   11 
The consequences of varying the life expectancy are extensively studied in the literature. Our 
model has some interesting predictions regarding this issue. In the standard theory relying on 
Blanchard Yaari structures, life expectancy (or the mortality rate) is exogenous. A downward 
shift  in  the  life  expectancy  generally  decreases  the  marginal  return  to  investment  in  this 
framework, implying less investment either in physical capital (as in the standard Blanchard 
model, 1985) and/or human capital (as in Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro, 2002). In our 
model, different kinds of epidemics can hit a generation of junior adults. The first and third 
kinds decrease the efficiency of adults’ health investment and the second kind increases the 
efficiency of this investment. Moreover, life expectancy is no longer exogenous. When an 
epidemic of the first or third kind shortens the life expectancy of junior adults, the adults’ 
health expenditure decreases for reasons similar to the ones we just gave and life expectancy 
decreases by more than what results from the direct effect of the epidemic. However, with an 
epidemic of the second kind, adults’ health expenditure increases, which reduces the direct 
effects of the epidemic. The effects of these epidemics on children’s heath investment are 
exactly opposite to those on their parents’ health spending: it increases with the first kind of 
epidemic and decreases with the second kind. 
Actually,  our  set up  has  more  subtle  predictions  concerning  children’s  health  care:  the 
investment  decisions  of  the  parents  are  also  sensitive  to  an  anticipated  drop  in  the  life 
expectancy  of  their  children.    If  this  drop  decreases  the  efficiency  of  children’s  health 
investment,  then,  their  parents  will  spend  more  on  their  own  health  and  less  on  their 
children’s health. If this drop increases the efficiency of children’s health investment, then 
their parents will invest less in their own health and more on the health of their children. The 
second result is easy to accept. Parents increase their health expenditures in the benefit of 
their children when they are subject to an exogenous deterioration of their health precisely 
because their utility is entirely determined by the expected human capital accumulated by 
children who will reach the adult age. To understand the first result we must remember that 
children benefit from growing under living parents: orphans will have a higher probability of 
dying  and  of  reaching  a  high  level  of  human  capital.  Thus,  parents  who  decrease  the 
investment  in  the  health  of  their  children  when  their  probability  of  survival  has  been 
decreased, continue of being perfectly altruistic. They only know that investing in their own 
health  instead  of  the  health  of  their  children  is  the  most  efficient  way  of  improving  the 
welfare of their children. 
   12 
The  elasticities  of  the  probability  of  survival  of  the  junior  adults  with  respect  to  the 
parameters  of  this  function,  are  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ' / / / / B Bl Bl B l B l + = ¶ ¶ p p ,  and 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ' / ' ' / / ' / B Bl B B l B l + = ¶ ¶ p p . We deduce from these expressions and Lemma 2 that an 
epidemic of the third kind will reduce the probability of survival of junior adults by a higher 
proportion and a higher level for the well endowed than for the poorly endowed ones. An 
epidemic of the second kind has the opposite effect. A first kind epidemic as a composite 
epidemic, will reduce the probability of survivals of well endowed and poorly endowed junior 
adults by the same proportion. We have a similar result for the effects of an epidemic hitting 
children on their probability of survival, and their dependence on the endowment of their 
parents. 
 
We remind that a junior adult is wholly altruistic, and that his utility is proportional to the 
expected  human  capital  accumulated  by  his  children  who  will  reach  the  adult  age: 
( ) [ ] 1 ) ( ) ( , 1 1 + = + + r l e e l U p l . We can draw the indifference curves of this utility function in the 
plan  ( ) 1 , + e l .  An  (anticipated)  composite  epidemic  hitting  children  and  such  that  the  two 
parameters of their survival function are reduced by the same proportion, decreases their 
probability of survival  ) ( 1 + e l  by the same percentage for all values of the spending on their 
health  1 + e . Thus, the indifference curves of the parent are unchanged although each of them 
will be associated with a lower value of utility. Consequently, the junior adult will not change 
the allocation of his health spending between himself and his children when he learns that his 
children will be hit by a composite epidemic. 
 
Similarly, an epidemic hitting junior adults and such that the two parameters of their survival 
function are reduced by the same proportion, decreases their probability of survival  ) (l p  by 
the same percentage for all values of the spending on their health l. However, the utility of 
the junior adult will be reduced by a proportion, which will increase with the spending on his 
own health. Thus, the slopes of the indifference curves will become less steep. Consequently, 
the junior adult will reduce his spending on his own health (and will increase the spending on 
the health of his children). 
 
Finally,  parents  will  have  to  bring  up  more  children  if  the  number  of  their  offspring  n 
increases. So, the death of a junior adult will create more orphans and its consequence will   13 
have become worse. This should imply a transfer of health spending from the whole of the 
children to their parents. However, under this transfer, health spending per child decreases 
first because total health spending on children has decreased, secondly because there are more 
children. This directly reduces the probability of survival of each child. The first effect is the 
stronger, except when parameter  ' A  is zero, when these effects exactly balance.   
 
2.2. Demographic variables 
The population alive in period  t  includes  + 2 N  and  - 2 N  junior adults with human capital 
endowments respectively equal to  + h  and  - h . It also includes  + 3 N  and  - 3 N  senior adults. 
Finally, it includes  + 1 N  ,  - 1 N  children who have parents with respective human capital   + h  , 
- h , and  + o N
1  ,  - o N
1  orphans with respectively high and low bequests. The parents of the two 
first kinds of children are the senior adults of the period. So, we have: 
(14)  + + =
3 1 nN N  and   - - =
3 1 nN N  
The populations  + o N
1  ,  - o N
1 ,  + 2 N ,  - 2 N ,  + 3 N  and  - 3 N  are predetermined in period t. The 
number of well endowed (poorly endowed) senior adults which will be alive in period  1 + t  is 
equal to the number of junior adults with the same endowment who are alive in period t, time 
their rate of survival  
(15)  + + +
+ =
2 3
1 ) ( N l N p ,   - - -
+ =
2 3
1 ) ( N l N p  
If we use equation (14) in period  1 + t  (notice that the total number of children in this period 
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The numbers of well endowed and poorly endowed junior adults in period  1 + t  are 
(17)  ( ) ( )
- - - + + + +
+ + + + =
o o qcN pN e qcN pN e N
1 1 1 1 2
1 ) ( ) ( l l , 
       ( ) ( )
+
+
- - - + + + -
+ - + + + =
2
1
1 1 1 1 2
1 ) ( ) ( N cN N e cN N e N
o o l l  
 
3. Dynamics and long run equilibrium 
We will start by examining the equations giving the dynamics of populations. Then, in a 
second paragraph, we will investigate the properties of this dynamics, when the environment 
of the economics is kept unchanged. 
3.1. The dynamics of populations   14 
There are  + 2 N  and  - 2 N  junior adults alive in period  0 ³ t . They will have  n children each. 
These children will either become  +
+
2
2 N  and  -
+
2
2 N  junior adults with earnings respectively 
equal to 
+ h  and 
- h  in period  2 + t , or they will die at the end of period  1 + t . 
2 + D  represents 
the supplementary number of junior adults who would exist in period  t if no children die 
before reaching the age of junior adult, that is if the survival rate function l  were identical to 
1. We will investigate the dynamics of the model for  2 ³ t . The states of the economy in 























































































[ ] { } cq l p l e a ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 11
+ + +
+ - + = p p l  
[ ] { } ) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 1 )( ( ) ( 1 21 q c l p l e a - - + - =
+ + +
+ p p l  
[ ] { } cq l p l e a ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 12
- - -
+ - + = p p l  
[ ] { }) ) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 1 )( ( ) ( 1 22 q c l p l e a - - + - =
- - -
+ p p l  
 
and with  ) 0 (
2+ N ,  ) 0 (
2- N  and  ) 0 ( D  given if t is even and  ) 1 (
2+ N ,  ) 1 (
2- N  and  ) 1 ( D  given if 
t is odd. 
Lemma  1,  2  and  3  imply  that  these  parameters  satisfy  the  constraints  1 0 11 12 < < < a a , 
1 0 21 22 < < < a a ,  1 21 11 22 12 < + < + a a a a   and 




+ l l e e q p c a a a a p p l l . 
 
The elements of each column of  M  are positive and sum to 1. So they can be interpreted as 
proportions, or as conditional probabilities for instance for a child of a well endowed junior 
adult to be well endowed or poorly endowed or dead two periods later.  
More precisely, 
12 11 a a -  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach a high 
level of human capital if his parent is well endowed versus if his parent is poorly endowed. 
22 21 a a -  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach a low level of human   15 
capital  if  his  parents  are  well endowed  versus  if  his  parents  are  poorly  endowed.  The 
difference between the probabilities for a child to die if his parents are well endowed versus if 
his parents are poorly endowed is  21 11 22 12 a a a a - - + . The fate of children is independent of 
the social position of their parents when 0 22 21 12 11 = - = - a a a a . 
Matrix  M  in period t only depends on health spending set by junior adults,  + l ,  - l ,  +
+1 e  and 
-
+1 e . These spending are functions of the values taken by a series of exogenous variables in 
period  t: the parameters of the survival functions of children and young adults  A,  ' A ,  B , 
' B , a  and  b  , the incomes of the junior adults 
+ h and 
- h  and the number of their children 
n.  
 
Equation (18) gives the dynamics of the numbers of junior adults and of the dead,  + 2 N ,  - 2 N  
and  D for  2 ³ t , when the values of these variables are given in periods 0 and 1. Equation 










3 ) ( N l N p  
for  1 ³ t . Equation (14) gives the dynamics of the number of non orphan children  + + =
3 1 nN N  
and  - - =
3 1 nN N   for  1 ³ t .  Finally,  the  numbers  of  orphans  in  period  1 ³ t   are  given  by 
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o . 
We define  D N N P + + =
- + 2 2   as the potential population of junior adults. It would be equal 
to the effective population if all children reached the age of junior adult. Equation (18) shows 
that this potential population grows at rate n:  2 2
2 nP P = + . The number of dead people is equal 
to  the  difference  between  the  potential  population  and  the  number  of  junior  adults: 
) (
2 2 - + + - = N N P D . Thus, we just have to investigate the dynamics of the numbers of living 
junior adults  + 2 N  and  - 2 N , which is given by 




























































with  ) 0 (
2+ N  and  ) 0 (
2- N  given if t is even and  ) 1 (
2+ N  and  ) 1 (
2- N  given if t is odd. In the 
rest of the paper we will assume that t is even. 
 
3.2. Characterization of the demographic dynamics  
We will assume in this section that all the parameters and exogenous variables stay constant 
over time for  0 ³ t . We will also assume that t is even. Then, matrix  M  will stay constant   16 
over  time,  and  the  dynamics  of  the  model  will  be  limited  to  the  sizes  of  the  various 
components of population (including the dead). Let us introduce the new variable 
 (20)  0 4 ) ( ) ( 4 ) ( 21 12
2
22 11 21 12 22 11
2
22 11 > + - = - - + º D a a a a a a a a a a  
We have the lemma 
Lemma  4.  a)  The  eigenvalues  of  matrix  ' M , 
1 r   and 
2 r ,  are  real  and  such  that 
0 1 2 1 > > > r r . Their expressions are  
(21)  2 / ) ( 22 11 1 D + + = a a r   and  2 / ) ( 22 11 2 D - + = a a r  
 






















V  the right-hand column eigenvectors of   ' M  and 
by  ( ) 2 1 V V V =  the matrix of these eigenvectors. A determination of these eigenvectors is  






D + + - D + -
-
=
11 22 11 22
12 12 2 2
a a a a
a a
V  
1 V  can be normed such that its components are positive and sum to 1.  2 V can be normed such 
that its first component is negative, its second component is positive and the sum of both 
components is equal to 1. 
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d) The elements of matrix W  satisfy the constraints  
(24)  0 12 11 > > w w  and  22 21 0 w w < <  
 
The proof is in the appendix. We can now establish the following crucial proposition which 
neatly characterizes the demographic dynamics and the evolution of human capital (and thus 
income) distributions over time. 
 
Proposition 1. Assume, to fix the ideas,  that  ) 0 ( ) 0 (
2 2 - + + N N =1. Then:   17 
a) The dynamic paths followed by the sizes of the cohorts of both kinds of junior adults, are 
linear combinations of two geometric series with rates equal to the growth rate of potential 
population n times  the eigenvalues of matrix  ' M   
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t t + - + + - = +
+ + + + + r r  









2 ) 0 ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) 2 ( w N w w v n w N w w v n t N
t t + - + + - = +
+ + + + - r r  
In the long run the populations of both kinds of junior adults will grow at a rate equal to the 
growth rate of the  potential population of junior adults times  the largest eigenvalue of 
matrix  ' M  (which is smaller than 1). The long run size of each group depends on the initial 
condition,  ) 0 (
2+ N . However, the long run proportions of the two groups of junior adults are 
independent of the initial conditions, and are precisely proportional to the two components of 
the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of matrix  ' M . 
 
b) Let us assume that its share of junior adults holding a high level of human capital in the 
initial population is decreased. In the long run, the sizes of both groups of junior adults will 
drop. In the short run, the number of junior adults holding a high level of human capital and 
the total size of the population of junior adults will unambiguously go down. In contrast, the 
number of junior adults holding a low level of human capital may increase in the short run. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 1 has several important implications, which will be 
illustrated later on in our application to epidemics next section. First of all, Property a) shows 
the ability of the model to generate hysteresis. This should not be though seen as a surprising 
result: this is a natural outcome in demographic models: initial demographic shocks are likely 
to have long lasting echo effects. Such effects may be dampened after a while, for example if 
fertility  markedly  changes  some  generations  after  the  initial  shock,  but  it  seems  out  of 
question that persistence is a fundamental property of demographic dynamics. Second, our 
model features that an initial change in the income distribution of the population may distort 
this  distribution  in  the  short  and  medium  terms  but  not  in  the  long  run.  This  is  a  very 
important property as we will see in the application to epidemics. Actually, one of the debates 
around AIDS (especially in sub Saharan Africa) is its impact on income inequality either in 
the short or long run. Our benchmark model delivers a very clear message in this respect as 
explained hereafter.    18 
4. The demographic and economic effects of epidemics  
We define an epidemic as an increase in the death rate of a generation of people lasting for 
only one period. Two kinds of epidemics will be considered in this paper. We shall study 
analytically  in  detail  the  impact  of  epidemics  of  the  first  kind,  that  is  those  lowering 
simultaneously and by the same magnitude the two parameters of the survival probabilities 
( A and  ' A  for children, and  B  and  ' B  for young adults). We then move to the epidemics of 
the second kind, which we analyze qualitatively so as to unburden the exposition. As one can 
deduce from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the dynamics induced by an epidemic of the third kind 
are qualitatively very similar to those following an epidemic of the first kind, at least for 
epidemics hitting young adults. Therefore, we disregard them. 
An epidemic hits people irrespectively of their endowment in human capital or of their social 
background.
9 We will assume that nothing can be done against the epidemic itself, although 
an increase in health spending will reduce the number of death the epidemic causes. Finally, 
we  shall  only  consider  one period  long  epidemics  occurring  in  period  0.  Longer 
epidemiological shocks would complicate tremendously the analytical treatment. As we shall 
see, one period long shocks are enough to capture the main mechanisms at work in the model 
and to identify the outcomes of an epidemic of a given kind and age profile of mortality.  
In all cases, we will start from a reference balanced growth path with a total population of 
junior adults equal to 1. We first define precisely such a balanced path. We can deduce from 
the  expressions  of  matrices  V and  W   given  in  Lemma  4  that  1 21 12 11 11 = + v w v w ,  and 
0 21 22 11 21 = + v w v w . The initial population of junior adults,  ) 0 ( ) 0 (
2 2 - + + N N , is equal to 1, and 
we norm eigenvector  1 V   in such a way that the sum of its two components is equal to 1. If the 
vector of the initial values of the populations of the two kinds of junior adults is equal to the 















,  the 
population of junior adults will follow the balanced growth path  
                                                 
9 The assumption that the reduction in the probability of survival is the same for junior adults with a high as with 
a low level of human capital is debatable. There are indications that people with a relatively high schooling level 
are more exposed to the risk of being hit by AIDS because they have more sexual partners (Cogneau and 
Grimm, 2005). There are also indications that these people are more aware of the risks of AIDS than less 
educated people and understand faster the usefulness of not engaging in risky behaviour, for instance they are 
more responsive to campaigns of information, and prevention (de Walque, 2004).The United Nations (2004) 
quotes several studies showing that poor and uneducated people are more likely to engage in risky behaviour 

























Proposition 1 shows that this steady state is relatively asymptotically stable. This will be our 
reference balanced growth path. We now move to our analysis of epidemics. For a better 
understanding, recall that total domestic output in our model is given by  
 
(28) 
- - + + + = h t N h t N t Y ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2  . 
 
4.1. Epidemics of the first kind 
4.1.1. An epidemic hitting children 
The  epidemic  takes  place  in  period  0  and  kills  a  given  proportion  of  children.  So,  the 
population of junior adults alive in period 1 will be reduced by the same proportion. However, 
the ratio between the numbers of well endowed and poorly endowed junior adults will be 
unchanged. The second effect will be that the population of junior adults will be reduced by a 
constant proportion in every odd period by the children, grandchildren, etc. who will not be 
born because of the death of their forebear. Domestic output will be reduced by the same 
proportion in odd periods.  
Let us investigate the problem at a more formal level. The value of parameters  A and  ' A  are 
decreased in a way such that  0 ' / ' / < = A dA A dA  in period 0. Under this assumption, even if 
the epidemic has been perfectly anticipated when junior adults set their investment decisions, 
they would have not changed these decisions in front of this information. Equations (18) and 
(19) show that matrix  ' M  is reduced by a factor  A dA/ ) 1 ( a -  in period 0. So, the populations 
of both kinds of junior adults in every odd period starting in period 1 are reduced by the same 
proportion. These populations remain unchanged in even periods. 
Equations (14), (15) and (16) show that in odd periods the numbers of senior adults and of 
children  of  each  category,  are  unchanged.  These  numbers  are  reduced  by  the  factor 
A dA/ ) 1 ( a -  in even periods starting in period 2. The only demographic change in period 0 is 
the death of children caused by the epidemic. Thus, the third consequence of the epidemic of 
period  0  is  an  echo  effect,  which  permanently  changes  the  demographic  structure  of  the 
population. The share of junior adults is reduced in every odd period and increased in every 
even period. Thus, even if domestic output per worker remains the same in these periods, 
domestic output per capita decreases in odd periods and increases in even periods.     20 
 As we can see, such an epidemic has some important demographic and economic effects 
either in the short or long run by inducing a permanent demographic composition effect and a 
change in output per capita (but not per worker). Nonetheless, the epidemic is shown to be 
neutral at all temporal horizons in terms of the income distribution among junior adults. The 
next section shows that ‘adult’ epidemics can in contrast distort such a distribution. 
 
4.1.2. An epidemic hitting junior adults 
The epidemic takes place in period 0 and kills a proportion of junior adults at the end of the 
period.  The number of children alive in period 1 will be unchanged but the proportion of 
orphans among them will be higher. The number of senior adults alive in period 1 will be 
lower as a result of the epidemic.  
Let us investigate the problem at a more formal level. Since the epidemic is of the first kind, 
we  are  in  the  situation  in  which  B   and  ' B   are  decreased  in  a  way  such  that 
0 ' / ' / < = B dB B dB  in period 0. Junior adults living in this period perfectly understand the 
consequences of the epidemic when they make their decisions. According to lemma 2, they 
will reduce their investment in their own health, and their survival rates at the end of the 
period will decrease by more than what results from the epidemic. Junior adults will also 
increase their investment in the health of their children in period 1, which will improve the 
survival rates of children in period 1. Thus, matrix  ' M  has been changed in period 0, and 
consequently  the  populations  of  junior  adults  in  period  2.  The  relative  variations  in  the 
populations of juniors adults holding a high level and a low level of human capital, in this 
period is  
(29) 
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The following lemma is an extension of lemmas 2 and 3. 
Lemma  5.  Let  us  consider  a  junior  adult  with  endowment  h,  and  a  decrease  in  the 
coefficients of his survival function by  0 ' / ' / < = B dB B dB . His probability of survival and the 
probability of survival of each of his children will change by 
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Proof.  See the appendix. 
 
An epidemic decreases the probability of survival of junior adults, first because it increases 
the death rate of this population, secondly because it reduces the spending of this population 
on  its  own  health.  This  epidemic  increases  the  probability  of  survival  of  children 
(conditionally on the facts that they are orphans or that their parents are alive) because parents 
spend more on the health of their children. The following lemma will be used in the proof of 
Proposition 2. 
 
Lemma 6. Consider a junior adult with endowment h who invests l in his own health. When 
parameters c and q change, the expression  
(35) 
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has a positive lower bound E  and an upper bound E smaller than 1. 
Proof.  See the appendix. 
 
The  following  proposition  will  give  the  changes,  taking  place  in  period  2,  in  the  total 
population of junior adults, and in the population of workers holding, respectively, a high 
level and a low level of human capital, induced by an epidemic taking place in period 0.  
 
Proposition 2. If the reduction in the probability of survival of orphans,  c - 1 , and if the 
probability for an orphan to reach a high level of human capital, q, are low enough, we have 
the following results. 
a) In period 2 the total population of junior adults increases. 
b) The population of junior adults holding a high level of human capital decreases, and the 
population of junior adults with a low level of human capital increases. Thus, the proportion 
of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in the total population increases. 
Consequently, domestic output per worker decreases. 
c) The numbers of each kind of children and senior adults are unchanged. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. When an epidemic takes place, well endowed junior adults will 
spend more on the health of their children. This will contribute to increasing the proportion of 
these children who will survive in period 2. However, more of these children will grow as 
orphans whose the probability of survival is reduced by a factor  c - 1 . If c is near enough to 1, 
the first effect will dominate and the number of junior adults alive in period 2 will be higher.  
 
In period 2, the number of junior adults who were orphans will increase and the number of 
those who were brought up by their parents will decrease. If the probability for an orphan to 
reach a high level of human capital, q, is low enough, the number of junior adults with a high 
level  of  human  capital,  alive  in  period  2,  will  become  lower.  The  two  assumptions  of 
Proposition 2 mean that orphans are more disadvantaged in their probability of reaching a 
high level of human capital than in their probability of dying before adult age.  
 
Proposition 2 is a crucial characterisation of the medium term distributional effects of ‘adult’ 
epidemics.  In  contrast  to  the  epidemic  only  killing  children,  considered  before,  the 
distributional consequences are significant in the medium run. More young adults will get less   23 
educated two periods after the epidemic and output per worker goes down: the economy is 
clearly  impoverished  (with  respect  to  the  reference  balanced  growth  path)  at  this  time 
horizon
10. Thus, the demographic and economic effects are clearly much more potentially 
dangerous when the epidemic hits junior adults than when it only affects children.  
The analysis of periods posterior to period 2 is cumbersome. We know that, in the long run, 
the shares of junior adults holding respectively a high level and a low level of human capital 
that is the income distribution will go back to their balanced growth values. So, in contrast to 
some contributions in the AIDS related literature (like Bell et al., 2003), the model predicts a 
kind  of    corrective  dynamics  which  will  bring  some  key  variables  to  the  corresponding 
balanced growth corresponding values. But we cannot even conclude on the long run change 
in the total population of junior adults without further assumptions.  However, we can note 
that just like ‘child’ epidemics and for the same reasons, we have some permanent effects, 
notably on the demographic composition of the economy.  
 
4.2. Epidemics of the second kind 
To  unburden  the  presentation,  we  shall  discuss  the  implications  of  the  epidemics  of  the 
second kind in qualitative terms. Of course, the algebra involved is pretty much similar to the 
previous analysis. 
 
4.2.1. Epidemics hitting children 
The  dynamics  induced  will  depend  closely  on  whether  the  parents  of  the  children  will 
anticipate  or  not  in  t= 1    the  shock  taking  place  in  t=0.  In  the  case  where  the  shock  is 
unanticipated,  we  get  a  similar  picture  as  the  one  depicted  in  Section  4.1.1  devoted  to 
epidemics of the first kind hitting children. But the shock might be perfectly anticipated: it 
could be so in the case of a chronic disease (like malaria) or because the economy has been 
experiencing  an  epidemic  hitting  adults  before  t=0,  which  is  likely  to  be  transmitted  to 
children (like AIDS). Let us isolate here the impact of the epidemic hitting children at t=0, 
anticipated by their parents one period before. In such a case, as documented in Lemma 2 and 
Lemma 3, the parents will spend less on their own health and more on the health of their 
children. This implies less senior adults in t=0 and more orphans too. In t=1, the number of 
senior adults is unchanged, and so is the number of children in the same period (since the 
                                                 
10 However, the share of the active population in the total population increases and we do not know if output per 
capita increases or decreases.    24 
number of young adults in t=0 is not affected by the epidemic).  However, the number of 
young adults generally diminishes in t=1. In effect, more orphans in t=0 means less young 
adults in t=1, and such an induced drop should be added to the direct effect of the epidemic 
killing  a  proportion  of  children  in  t=0.    On  the  other  side,  if  the  parents  anticipate  the 
epidemic in t=0 and spend more on the health of their children, then the survival probability 
of children is higher, which tends to increase the number of junior adults in t=1. The latter 
effect is generally dominated by the two former negative effects, including the direct one. 
Henceforth, the number of junior adults should drop in period t=1, leading to a further drop in 
the number of children and senior adults in t=2. However, the number of junior adults in 
unchanged in period t=2, since the number of children at t= 1 and their survival probability is 
unaffected by the initial shock and its further consequences. 
Therefore except the fact that the number of senior adults should also drop in t=0 in contrast 
to the epidemic of the first kind hitting children for which such a figure starts to fall from t=2, 
we  have  qualitatively  the  same  kind  of  demographic  dynamics  as  in  Section  4.1.1:  The 
epidemics of the first and second kind hitting children at t=0 induce a permanent demographic 
restructuring with the proportion of junior adults rising in even periods and decreasing in odd 
periods. 
Nonetheless,  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  epidemic  of  the  first  kind,  the  current  epidemic 
configuration has short and medium term distributional effects. Even fully anticipated, an 
epidemic of the first kind hitting children will not affect the income distribution because the 
investment decisions of the junior adults are unaltered. However, an epidemic of the second 
kind does alter such investment decisions if it is anticipated one period behind: junior adults 
at t= 1 will invest more on the health of their children and less on themselves. The situation is 
quite similar to the one algebraically investigated in Section 4.1.2 above which impact two 
periods after the shock is summarized by Proposition 2: under the same conditions, that it is if 
orphans are more penalized in the access to a high level of human capital than in terms of 
survival rates, the proportion of skilled junior adults or workers will drop in t=1, leading to 
the fall of output per worker in this period.  
 
Thus while the two epidemics share almost the same qualitative demographic impact, the 
short and medium term economic and distributional are quite different in the case where the 
epidemics are anticipated by the parents. In particular, an anticipated epidemic of the second   25 
kind hitting children has a negative distributional effect in t=1 while the epidemic of the first 
kind, even fully anticipated, has none.  
 
4.2.2. Epidemics hitting young adults 
In contrast to epidemics of the first kind hitting young adults at t=0, the latter will not react by 
cutting their health expenditures and increasing those of their children: they will do just the 
opposite. Nonetheless, this will not reverse all the results stated in Proposition 2. In effect, 
even  if  the  young  adults  increase  their  health  expenditures,  the  induced  gain  in  life 
expectancy is generally not sufficient to compensate the decrease in the number of young 
adults directly caused by the epidemic in t=0. Henceforth, while we will have more young 
adults surviving in t=1 and therefore less orphans compared to the case studied in Section 
4.1.2,  we  will  still  have  less  senior  adults  and  more  orphans  in  t=1  compared  to  the 
benchmark  balanced  growth  path.  The  situation  is  definitely  worse  in  t=2:  in  contrast  to 
``adults’’ epidemics of the first kind, since the young adults in t=0 will invest less in the 
health of their children, we will have unambiguously less junior adults in t=2. The proportion 
of unskilled junior adults will also increase (compared to the balanced growth path) exactly as 
in  epidemic  shocks  studied  in  the  two  previous  sections,  which  lowers  again  output  per 
worker in t=2. 
 
It seems therefore crystal clear that the epidemics of the second kind generally lead to a more 
negative evolution either from the demographic or economic point of view. In particular, a 
striking difference between the two epidemics is that while the epidemic of the first kind 
increases the number of junior adults in t=2, the epidemic of the second kind induces just the 
contrary. It is now time to switch to a more factual evidence to substantiate the discussion.  
 
4.3. Discussion 
In  order  to  meaningfully  sum  up  all  the  results  obtained  for  the  short  and  medium term 
dynamics, we hereafter discuss them in four distinct points, two demographic (population size 
and age pyramid) and two economic (output and productivity, and income distribution). 
 
a)  Population  size:  Putting  together  the  implications  of  epidemics  of  the  first  kind 
hitting children and adults at t=0, one gets the following picture. In the short run, say 
t=1, the epidemic hitting children mechanically decreases the number of junior adults   26 
while keeping unaltered the numbers of senior adults and children. Therefore, overall 
the total effect of this epidemic is a decrease in the size of the population at t=1. On 
the other hand, the epidemic hitting junior adults only modifies the number of senior 
adults in t=1. So putting together both shocks, we have a clearly declining population 
size  in  t=1.  However,  in  t=2,  we  get  the  opposite  prediction:  while  the  epidemic 
hitting children decreases the size of the population (both the number of children and 
senior adults decline whereas the number of junior adults is unaltered), the epidemic 
hitting adults does the opposite since the number of junior adults gets increased in t=2 
under this epidemic (See proposition 2). Henceforth, if we assume consistently with 
the W shaped age profile of mortality observed for major epidemics like the Spanish 
flu or AIDS that the mortality impact of the epidemic is stronger on junior adults than 
on  children,  we  get  a  counter factual  overall  effect,  that  is  an  increase  in  the 
population size in the medium run (t=2), driven by the increase in the number of 
junior adults in the period, which is itself due to the increase in the investment in the 
health of children following the shock at the end of the period t=0. This overall effect 
goes for example at odds with most of the demographic projections performed in the 
AIDS case.
11 
In contrast, the epidemic of the second kind entails the opposite optimal investment 
response  under  adult  epidemics:  more  health  expenditures  for  junior  adults  at  the 
expense of health expenditures on children. As a consequence, the key mechanism 
yielding the counter factual prediction above is just reversed, and we get a much more 
satisfactory picture if we want to replicate AIDS medium term demographic impact. 
This property is confirmed in the next point. 
 
b)  Age  pyramid:  In  the  short  run  (t=1),  the  epidemics  of  the  first  and  second  kind 
(hitting children) both imply a reduction in the proportion of young adults, which is 
also  a  key  economic  implications  since  these  adults  are  also  the  workers  of  the 
economy.
12 The crucial difference between the epidemics arises in t=2 for the same 
reason  as  before.  While  the  epidemic  of  the  first  kind  (hitting  adults)  entails  a 
mechanism inducing an increase in the number of young adults in t=2,  the epidemic 
                                                 
11 For instance in the 2004 United Nations report, the predictions point rather at a sharp fall in total population 
by 2020 in Sub Saharan Africa (38 countries), about 14% less than without AIDS.   27 
of the second kind yields just the contrary. Again, the implications of the epidemics of 
the second kind are much more consistent with the available AIDS projections.
13 
c)  Output and productivity: In contrast to the demographic indicators studied above, 
the  epidemics  of  first  and  second  kind  both  predict  the  worsening  of  economic 
performance in the short and medium run. This could be easily captured by declining 
output per capita or output per worker or possibly both in t=1 and t=2. A nice feature 
of the theory is that even in the case where the working population is rising, which 
happens  to  be  the  case  of  adult  epidemics  of  the  first  kind  in  period  t=2,  this 
demographic ``advantage” is offset  by the increasing proportion of unskilled, which 
leads output per worker to fall down. 
 
d) Income distribution: The same type of conclusions can be reached for distributional 
effects.  While  only  the  epidemic  of  the  second  kind  has  a  (probably  slight) 
distributional effect in the short run, that is t=1, both have such a consequence in the 
medium term, when t=2. Adult epidemics, either of the first or second kind, do trigger 
an  increase  in  the  proportion  of  unskilled  junior  adults  in  t=2,  which  features  an 
unambiguous  impoverishment  of  the  economies  in  the  medium  run.  It  should  be 
clearly noted at this point that this property of the model derives from the singularity 
of a rising category under epidemics, orphans. Under our working assumptions (see in 
particular Proposition 2), that it is if orphans are more penalized in the access to a high 
level of human capital than in terms of survival rates, which seems quite reasonable, 
they will necessarily lead to the medium term increase in the proportion of unskilled.  
 
The previous discussion makes clear the main findings of the paper regarding the short and 
medium term dynamics. First of all, whatever the effect of the epidemic on the marginal 
efficiency of health expenditures, there is a clear negative effect on economic performance. 
Second,  although  epidemics  have  no  long run  distributional  consequences  according  to 
Proposition 1, they do involve an impoverishment orphans based mechanism in the medium 
term (say t=2) through the increasing proportion of unskilled workers. Third, epidemics of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
12 Note that in our case, this property is a non trivial consequence of a shock which takes place in the initial 
period. Naturally, a lasting epidemic like AIDS has additionally a direct effect on the demographic composition 
at t=2. 
13 The projections included in the 2004 United Nations report for Botswana show up a huge effect on the age 
structure of its population by 2025: more than half of the potential population aged 35 59 would have been lost 
to AIDS.   28 
second kind, that is epidemics increasing the marginal efficiency of health expenditures, seem 
to perform much better than epidemics of the first kind to produce reasonable demographic 
predictions if we have in mind the AIDS case.  It is difficult to dig much deeper within our 
abstract  framework  but  the  last  point  calls  certainly  for  a  much  finer  assessment  of  the 
relationship between life expectancy and health expenditures, and specially its sensitivity to 
epidemic shocks. 
 
5. Concluding:  
In this paper, we have presented a full analytical theory of dynamics and income distribution 
under  epidemics.  A  peculiarity  of  the  theory  with  respect  to  the  usual  set ups  is  the 
neutralization of the wage and fertility effects typically invoked, allowing for the isolation 
and the inspection of new transmission mechanisms of the epidemiological shocks. Another 
peculiarity is to consider both infant and adult mortality in a framework with endogenous 
survival  probabilities,  letting  epidemics  either  increase,  decrease  or  leave  unchanged  the 
marginal efficiency of health expenditures. In our view, this enlarges meaningfully the scope 
of the theory.  
 
Within  this  framework,  we  have  analytically  shown  several  properties.  First,  transitory 
epidemiological shocks have permanent effects on the size of population and on the level of 
output. However, the income distribution is shown to be unaltered in the long run. Second, 
under the reasonable assumption that orphans are more penalized in the access to a high level 
of  human  capital  than  in  terms  of  survival  rates,  we  show  that  this  distribution  can  be 
seriously altered in the medium term due to an increasing proportion of unskilled workers. 
Third, the latter negative impact is coupled with a worsening of economic performance in the 
medium  term  as  measured  by  output  per  capita  or  per  worker.  The  recent  demographic 
evidence on the quickly rising number of orphans are therefore of crucial importance: if not 
conveniently treated (for example by internationally funded social aid programs for orphans), 
this problem is likely to induce a sharp worsening of poverty in the medium run. 
 
Of course, the mechanisms isolated in this paper are not the unique relevant in the analysis of 
the socio economic impact of epidemics. We have already mentioned the possible wage and 
fertility effects. It is not obvious at all how these effects interact in reality, and what could be   29 
(or  could  have  been)  their  relative  significance  in  concrete  epidemic  episodes.  We  are 
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Proof of Lemma 4 
 a) The eigenvalues of matrix  ' M  are the roots of the characteristic equation  
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 21 12 22 11 22 11
2 = - + + - º L a a a a a a S r r  
The discriminant of this equation is  0 > D . So, the two eigenvalues of  ' M  are distinct and 
real. Their product is given by  ] [ 1 , 0 ) 0 ( 21 12 22 11 Î - º a a a a S . Moreover we have  
21 12 22 11 21 12 22 11 22 11 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ( a a a a a a a a a a S - - - = - + + - º  
As  we  have 
21 11 1 a a > -   and 
12 22 1 a a > - ,  we  can  conclude  that  0 ) 1 ( > S .  Thus,  the  two 
eigenvalues of matrix  ' M  are strictly included between 0 and 1.  
 
b) We have 
( ) 21 12 11 11 11 1 11 22 11 2 / v a v a v v a a + = = D + + r , so  
( ) 21 12 11 11 22 2 v a v a a = D + -  
We also have  
( ) 22 12 12 11 22 2 v a v a a = D - -  
So, a determination of the eigenvectors is given by equation (24). The two components of  1 V  
are positive and we can norm this eigenvector by setting  1 21 11 = +v v . Moreover the sum of 
the  two  components  of  2 V   is  positive  and  we  can  norm  this  eigenvector  by  setting 
1 22 12 = + v v  
 
c) We deduce from  I VW =  
1 ) ( 2 21 11 12 = -w w a    32 
0 ) ( 2 22 12 12 = -w w a  
0 ) ( ) )( ( 21 11 21 11 11 22 = + D + - - w w w w a a  
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d)  The  inequalities  are  easy  to  check.  For  example, 
12 11 w w >     is  equivalent  to 
) ( 2 11 22 12 a a a - + > D . A sufficient condition for this inequality is   
) ( 4 ) ( 4 ) ( 11 22 12 12
2
11 22 21 12
2
22 11 a a a a a a a a a a - + + - > + - º D , or  
22 12 21 11 a a a a + > + , which is true.  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 a) Let R be the diagonal matrix with elements 
1 r  and 
2 r . Then (21) can be rewritten 
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In the long run, under  1 ) 0 ( ) 0 (
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This establishes directly property a).  
 
b) We deduce from equation (25) and (26) the dynamics of the total population of junior 
adults 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 22
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We know from Lemma 4d that  0 12 11 > > w w , and  22 21 0 w w < < . Lemma 4b established that 
0 , , 22 21 11 > v v v ,  0 12 < v , and  0 22 12 > +v v  also hold.     33 
Now  notice  that,  if  ) 0 (
2+ N   is  decreased,  then  ) 2 (
2 +
+ t N   will  go  down.    As  2 1 r r > , 
) 2 ( ) 2 (
2 2 + + +
- + t N t N   drops  too  if  0 ) )( ( ) )( ( 22 21 22 12 12 11 21 11 ³ - + + - + w w v v w w v v .  The 
expressions  of  matrices  V and  W given  in  Lemma  4  show  that  the  left hand  side  of  this 
inequality is equal to 0. However, we do not know if  ) 2 (
2 +
- t N  increases or decreases in the 
short  run.  Indeed,  by  the  same  reasoning  as  just  before,  this  figure  would  go  down  if  
0 ) ( ) ( 22 21 22 12 11 21 ³ - + - w w v w w v .  Unfortunately this expression turns out to be equal to 
( ) D - 12 4 a , which is negative. Therefore anything could happen in the short run as for the 
number of low human capital junior adults. □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 5 
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We deduce from equation (14)  
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If we differentiate equation (8) and use the previous equation, we get equation (33). We 
deduce from equation (7) 
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If we substitute the above expression of  l dl /  we get equation (34).   
 
Proof of Lemma 6 
Equation (5) and the conditions on the parameters imply that  r  is positive and has an upper 
bound.  Moreover,  Lemma  1  established  that  h l < < 0 .  The  second  expression  of  E  
establishes  ( ) ( )
A nBA
B Bh
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Each of the two factors appearing in the first expression of E  are smaller than 1.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2   34 
a) The change in the number of junior adults living in period 2, whose parents held a high 
level of human capital is, according to equation (18) 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { }





























































We use equation (34) and get  
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Equation (33) shows that  ( ) 0 21 11 > + a a d  is equivalent to 
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We use equation (14) and get 
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Lemma 6 shows that  ( )
+ + l h E ,  has a positive lower bound. So, for  c near enough to 1, the 
inequality is satisfied.   35 
A similar computation shows that  ( ) 0 22 12 > + a a d . Then, equation (31) establishes part a of 
the proposition.  
b) We have 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } cq cq p l e d a d + - =
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Equation (33) shows that  ( ) 0 11 < a d  is equivalent to 
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We use equation (14) and get 
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According to lemma 6, a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is 






, with  1 / 1 > E  
For  q  near  enough  to  0,  the  inequality  is  satisfied.  A  similar  computation  shows  that 
( ) 0 12 < a d . Then, equation (29) establishes part b of the proposition.  
 
 
 
 